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 THE  EU CONSOLIDATED INCOME TAX REVISITED 
by Sylvain R.F. PLASSCHAERT *
I/ Introduction 
The recent Report of the European Commission--The last fifty pages of the
voluminous report of the European Commission on ‘Company Taxation in the Internal
Market’, released on October 23, 2001, will no doubt stir lively debates.
1 As a matter
of fact, they open bold, even revolutionary perspectives for the imposition of the
profits of multinational enterprises ( MNE’s ) which conduct cross-border activities in
the EU, through their subsidiaries or branches.  
Four comprehensive solutions’are examined in the Report. They are sketched in
section III..  One amongst them, the ‘EU Tax on Consolidated Profits of Multinational
Enterprises” ( EUCIT), was originally proposed by the undersigned in an article in
1997. But in the meantime, a number of developments, mentioned in section II, have
converged to render the search for a more ‘holistic’ solution not only conceivable, but
desirable—as evidenced by the thrust of the Report and by the explicit statement in the
‘Communication from the Commission  to the Council, the European Parliament and
the Economic and Social Committee, which accompanied the Report and which states:
“The Commission therefore believes it is only logical to steer its company taxation
policy towards achieving a comprehensive solution to the existing cross border tax
obstacles in the Internal market “ ( p.16).  
The political orientations, so far--  The Report itself does not yet take a definitive
stand in favour of one of the alternatives and urges more analysis of the many
technical problems, that would have to be solved before a comprehensive scheme
could be achieved.  But it quite openly states that a move towards such a EU-wide
solution should be actively contemplated, as it would signify a substantial
improvement of the corporate tax scene. 
Yet, at this stage, in the ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council, the
European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, some political choices
have already been made; this is also reflected in the Report. One fundamental
principle has been affirmed, namely that “… it is necessary (…) for the Member States
, to determine the applicable national corporate tax rates “  ( p.16) while provid(ing)
companies with a consolidated corporate tax base for their EU-wide activities and
develop(ing) an appropriate apportionment mechanism which can be agreed by all
participants” ( ibid. ). This position has been steadfastly defended by Commissioner
Bolkestein, in charge of financial and fiscal affairs, and has been agreed by the
Commission itself. In arguing in favour of this stance, the Communication invokes the
principle of subsidiarity”, according to which the level of taxation is a matter for the
Member States to decide”. The Communication also states that “this essential sphere
of national competence in the area of company taxation would –intentionally—remain
untouched and Member States would be left with the autonomy to adjust the most
important element or tax revenues “(p. 17) . 2
The business world, represented in the expert panel II, which has assisted the
Commission, is on record of insisting that Member States retain the competence for
the determination of the rates; this would “ensure that there was an opportunity for an
appropriate element of transparent tax competition between Member States“(p.376 of
the Report). The business world also views the continuation of differentiated rates as a
safeguard against a rise in the tax burden on companies, as competition with regards to
rates amongst the Member States is likely to exert  a downward pressure on them.    
Consequently, the recent stance of the Commission narrows down the choice of a
comprehensive scheme to the Common Consolidated Base Tax ( CCBT ) on the one
hand, and the Home State Taxation(  HST), on the other hand. The EUCIT, fitted with
a single tax rate at EU-level, is not retained at present; whereas, as already mentioned,
the fourth conceivable broad alternative system, the Single Compulsory Harmonized
Tax Base is not a realistic proposition and is not further discussed in the Report.  
Although differentiated national rates are presently preferred by the business world
and by the Commission, only the subsequent debates will indicate whether the EUCIT,
which features a single rate, is definitely buried. Some voices have already been heard
in favour of a single rate.
2 Besides, the Commission’s Communication refers to a
major finding of the Report, in its innovative
3 Part II . The quantitative analyses that
were conducted found that nominal tax rates are the most important determinant of
effective tax rates. The Communication  states that “to the extent that taxation matters,
introducing a common rate in the EU would be likely to go some way in reducing
locational inefficiencies “ ( p. 8). In other words, when positing the national
competence with respect to company tax rates, the Commission accords precedence to
the sovereignty of Member States as regards the nominal rate-setting over the
allocational inefficiencies which the differences in nominal rates involve and which
are repeatedly mentioned in the Report ( p. 167, 423). 
All in all, in all likelihood, the EUCIT, and/or some of its variants, although not
favoured at present, will remain on the drawing board as one of the alternative models
that could achieve a ‘comprehensive solution‘ to the problems of profit taxation,
besetting MNE’s that operate in the EU arena. 
This article has the limited scope of revisiting the EUCIT, from two main angles. It
essentially discusses, in section IV , the main technical problems, that would have to
be solved, and the related political options made, previous to the launching of a
EUCIT scheme;   several of these ‘prerequisites’ would also have to be met in other
comprehensive models, more particularly in the CCBT.  Besides, in the course of the
analysis, variants on the original formats of the EUCIT and the CCBT emerge. The
hurdles to be overcome are daunting, but the rewards to be reaped by the adoption of a
more holistic system within the EU are worth those troubles, as analysed in the final
section V. 
II/ Factors that drive  towards Comprehensive Approaches 
The Commission’s Report contrasts with the( Ruding) Report of the Committee of
Independent Experts on Company Taxation“ ( March 1992) which did not find  a
“sufficiently strong justification for the total harmonization of corporate taxes “( p.
201 ); yet, it  advocated the removal of special tax regimes designed to attract3
internationally mobile business.  But since about ten years, several developments
impart a strong momentum to the search for comprehensive solutions.  As a matter of
fact: 
a)  The advent of the Single Market leads enterprises to repositioning themselves
within the (now) Single Market.  Business views the EU increasingly as a single
area of involvement; the commonality of the currency in 12 out of the 15 member
countries, within Euroland,  reinforces global perspective.  Hence, MNE’s  tend to
replace the country-by-country organizational set-up by one, whereby  activities
are typically organized per product line in a EU-wide framework. 
b)  Moreover, optimizing the value chain within MNE’s  is now increasingly achieved
by entrusting each portion of the economic processes to different, but
interdependent facilities in various countries( and not  only within the E.U ), in
which they  enjoy a comparative advantage (in terms e.g. of high-level skills, or
lower labour costs ),which strengthens their competitiveness. Firms are
increasingly integrated across national frontiers. Hence a growing gap and
inconsistency between the way international business is conducted and how their
profit-generating activities are made liable to corporate income taxes. As a matter
of fact, the present arrangements are predicated on the ‘separate entity’ paradigm,
whereby each of the entities that compose a MNE – the parent company , and the
affiliates ( i.e. both incorporated subsidiaries and branches, which are not vested
with legal personality)—is taxed separately. As both the ‘residence’ country of the
parent company and the‘source’country,  where the profits of the affiliates
originate, are in principle  entitled to impose the profits of the affiliates, the latter
would be hit by an unbearable level of  international double taxation.  
Bilateral double taxation agreements and unilateral retrenchments by the home
countries alleviate such international tax duplication. What could, somewhat
euphemistically be called an ‘international corporate tax system’ consists therefore of
a mosaic of national tax laws, whose intricacies are exacerbated by the rules that
govern the cross-border dimensions of each national corporate tax system. It is often
exceedingly difficult to delineate, and adjudicate, which portion of the overall profit of
an  MNE- group, with its  densely interwoven activities, should be  attributed to each
of its members. 
The difficulties are particularly acute as regards the ‘transfer’ or ‘internal’ prices that
are practised within MNE’s on internal flows of goods and services. The national tax
administrations want to thwart gambits, whereby the prices on intra-MNE transactions
would be modulated, so as to siphon off part of the taxable profit to a taxwise more
lenient jurisdiction. The transfer pricing  regulations, which have become codified and
put into practice by a growing number of countries, are based on the ‘arm’s length
price’ criterion, which, in  essence, administers  the ‘separate entity‘ basic norm of
international taxation to intra-MNE transactions. The ‘ arm’s length price’ standard
posits that the prices of internal transactions should equal the price that would obtain
on similar transactions between unaffiliated business entities. Although this yardstick
is economically sound, its implementation to the myriad of internal transactions,  for
which often no ‘comparable price’ between unrelated parties, is available, raises
almost insurmountable hurdles. Today’s transfer pricing regulations have become4
exceedingly complex and even acrobatic, with resulting high compliance costs both
for the MNE’s and for tax administrations.  
c) As a result of the ‘separate entity’ and ‘ arm’s length price’ standards, companies
with  EU-ambitions may have to deal with up to 15 different tax legislations and
regulations, and with the related interpretative glosses. The representative
organizations of international businesses, and more particularly the UNICE, are  on
record of favouring more comprehensive approaches.
4 
d) Another impetus derives from the initiatives  within the EU-- and also in the wider
OECD area-- to eliminate preferential fiscal provisions that are harmful to
competition. Unjustifiable differences in tax parameters should not interfere with
‘neutrality’ or ‘economic efficiency’. This policy objective is particularly relevant  to
the EU, which aims at achieving a single internal market.  Thus, to eliminate such
distortions in 1998 a ‘Code of Conduct’ was agreed upon:  action is being taken to roll
back 66 preferential treatments in national tax legislations, that have been identified by
the Primarolo group as ‘harmful’. Similar state aids through the tax medium are
equally aimed at. 
e)In the same context, one should mention the endeavours of the OECD, against the
use and abuse of tax havens. The events of September, 11, 2001, are likely to re-
enforce these actions, as the funding of terrorist activities, deals in drugs and criminal
money are often intertwined  with  tax evasion. 
f) The recently agreed ‘European Company’ statute simplifies the legal aspects of
running a business within the EU and ‘europeanizes’ to some extent the company law.
But the new statute contains no provisions in the tax field; it follows that the
businesses in the format of the ‘societas europaea’, in terms of company law will,  as
before, face up to 15 different corporate profits tax legislations. This intensifies the
pressure to complement the new statute with a suitable  tax regime, which   would
have to be conceived in a comprehensive manner, that transcends national tax
legislations. 
g) Finally, the debate about the future political framework of the EU can no longer be
avoided. Some authorities have made a plea for a federal superstructure, of sorts.
Within such framework, the federal level of government could well be provided with
revenues out of (some) ‘own taxes’ and not any longer solely with  ‘own resources’ (
which consists of revenues levied by Member States and transferred to EU level ).
Some variants of comprehensive schemes, and certainly the EUCIT, could then
become prime candidates for a genuine EU tax. The present ceiling on EU revenues,
amounting to 1,27 % of the aggregate Gross Domestic Product, may well will prove
inadequate to shoulder the prospective responsibilities of the E.U, beyond 2006,
especially as a result of the accession of up to 10 candidate-countries. This would add
a budgetary argument for the introduction of a genuine EU tax, apart from the
structural one of supplying the EU with  a tax handle of its own. 
III/ The major Characteristics of the four Alternative Comprehensive
Models5
The Commission’s Report discusses, at great length, four basic alternatives of
comprehensive models. They are briefly presented here, in ascending order of
Europeanisation, i.e. of lifting the normative competence in the field of company
taxation from the Member States to EU level.  
A/ Model I:  Home State Taxation ( HST ) 
The intellectual pedigree of the HST is rooted in that of ‘mutual recognition’, a
concept that is a vector of integration within the E.U, and is resorted to in the area of
financial services. Thanks to such ‘passport’,  Member States B, C…  allow financial
intermediaries, domiciled in A, to offer financial products in their own territories. 
The basic underlying idea of HST is that the taxable profits originating from the
affiliates (subsidiaries or branches) of MNE’s in other Member Countries, i.e in host
countries, would be determined and computed according to the tax code of the Home
State, i.e.   that of  the parent company. 
Logically, the taxable bases of  the parent company and those of its affiliates in
countries that  participate in the HST scheme would be consolidated , implying loss
compensation.  But each of the countries involved would apply its own tax rate(s). To
avoid that the tax administrations would become entangled in the complexities of
determining the geographic source of the profits, in the light of the presently
prevailing ‘separate entity‘ paradigm, a ‘formulary apportionment mechanism’,
similar to that in model II, to be sketched in a moment, would have to be agreed upon. 
The proponents of the HST model, which has already been analysed in considerable
detail,
5 view their model as a optional one: companies, located in participating
Member States, would be free to join or to stay out; in the latter case, the taxable base
of an affiliate would, as at present, be shaped by the legislation in its own, i.e. in the
host country.  
As the Report stresses, the Member States that would adhere to a HST scheme should
have previously reached a fair degree of convergence in the definition of their taxable
bases, and more generally, in their tax structures.  Hence, it is not anticipated that the
HST system could be adopted by all Member States simultaneously; it is more likely
to be implemented by a limited group of like-minded Member States. 
B/ Model II:   The Common ( Consolidated ) Base Tax  ( CCBT ) 
6
This approach, suggested by UNICE and the European Round Table, advocates the
adoption-- preferably by all Member States, or at least a number amongst them-- of a
new EU code, as regards the definition of the taxable base.  MNE’s would then be
imposed on the consolidated results of their units that are operated within the EU. 
However, this  ‘Europeanisation’ of company taxation does not extend to the rate
setting: each  Member State that joins the scheme would retain the right to fix its own
rate(s).  But as the traditional ‘separate entity‘ approach would be too tedious, and is
of questionable precision, recourse to a system of ‘formulary apportionment’ is
contemplated.  The system of ‘unitary taxation’, that applies at the level of the
individual States in the USA , and of the Provinces in Canada, could in essence be
replicated; fairly easily ascertainable ‘activity indicators’, viz.  the value of assets,
labour costs and sales, are thereby retained , to determine the percentage share of the6
jurisdictions involved in the consolidated taxable base of each taxpaying company. In
the EU context, each Member State would then  apply its own rate to its percentage
share of  the base.  Such indirect criteria act as proxies for the  ‘real’ profits that would
have been determined according to the ‘separate entity’ methodology; in other words
each Member State would, kin principle, be entitled to that part of the taxable basis,
which is deemed to originate within its borders—resulting in what has been termed a
‘juste retour’. 
In the view of the proponents of the CCBT, the scheme would be an optional one :
companies would in essence be free to adopt the scheme; if they do not join, the
various units within the same MNE, would, as today, remain subjected to the tax laws,
in each of the Member States,  in which they earn profits ( or incur losses). 
C/ Model III : The European Union Company Income Tax ( EUCIT ) 
This model, on which this article focuses, goes one step further. It not only proposes  a
common consolidated tax base, as under model II , but also a single rate, which  would
be fixed at  EU level; in other words, Member States would no longer be empowered
to fix their own rates. 
In the original version of the model,
7 the revenues deriving from the EUCIT,  would,
quite logically, accrue to the EU, to defray its own expenditures. Accordingly, the new
tax would be a genuine EU tax, and not only represent revenue shared by the EU out
of national tax resources.  In this sense, the EUCIT is conceived not only within the
framework of a federal, or supranational system—which also characterizes the CCBT
and even the HST, as the Member States would have to divest themselves of the
competence to design the taxable base—but it would be a parameter of a real system
of fiscal federalism, which organizes the public expenditures and the fiscal revenues of
the various levels of government, in casu, those at the EU level and at that of the
Member States.
As the revenues would , in principle, accrue to the E.U itself , there would be no need
for a primary, formulary apportionment of the EUCIT over the Member States, such as
the one contemplated for the CCTB.  Besides, the EUCIT does not look at proxies but
at actual profits, that are determined in line with the customary accounting practices of
businesses. 
Depending on the perimeter of applicability of the EUCIT, its resulting yield  might
happen to exceed the needs of the EU. In such case, a secondary formulary
apportionment system could be devised. This could adopt the criteria of, say, the
American or Canadian system at state level, as under model II; in such case, for each
of the taxpaying MNE’s, one would have to construe the values of the proxies. But as
the EUCIT is conceived as a building stone to a system of fiscal federalism, it would
be more appropriate, and simpler, to follow the logic of equalization systems, that are
applied in federal systems:  instead of aiming at the ‘ juste retour’, the allotment of the
extra proceeds of the EUCIT could be designed so as to redistribute part of the
proceeds in favour of the relatively poorer Member States. In other words, instead of
re-allocating such extra revenues over the Member States in the light of micro-level
indicators, relating to each individual MNE, ‘macro keys, such as the Gross Domestic
Product could be retained.
8 How the allocational pattern of the proceeds from the7
EUCIT would be organized and how it differs from that under the CCBT is further
investigated in section IV 3/. 
D/ Model IV.  A Single, Compulsory ‘Harmonized Tax Base’ 
This model would imply the substitution of all present, 15 corporate tax systems by a
single one, “to be applied across the E.U, to all enterprises” ( i.e. to all  corporate
entities )( Report, p. 377).  By definition, the tax legislations would be harmonized --
in fact unified. Equally, the base would be a consolidated one. As the revenue out of
that tax would accrue to the Member States, and not to the E.U, a formulary
apportionment system would be applied, as under scheme II.  Contrary to the previous
three models, all corporate entities would be subjected to this tax; they would not be
allowed to opt out of this tax.  
While obviously permitting a monumental simplification and substantial savings in
compliance costs, this model is not a realistic proposition, before very long. It is
therefore not further discussed in the Report, which mentions it only for the sake of
completeness.  
IV/  Technical and  Political Prerequisites for the European Union Company
Income Tax and for the Common Consolidated Tax Base 
The efficient implementation of the EUCIT would require adequate solutions to a number of
fundamental, and difficult issues, which  most often transcend technical matters as they call
for  political choices. Many of these problem areas are common to the CCBT and even to the
HST; but the latter model will not be systematically brought into the picture here, as its
underlying philosophy differs considerably from that of the EUCIT and the CCBT. In
discussing these problem areas, I often  start from objections that can be raised against the
EUCIT , or the CCBT,  and then proceed with rejoinders.  
 
The following items come up for discussion hereafter : 
-  1. the perimeter of the EUCIT . To which categories of companies should it apply?
 
-  2. the taxable base of the EUCIT, including its consolidation over the Member 
States 
-  3. the applicable rate and the allotment of the proceeds of the EUCIT to the EU 
itself and/or to the Member States   
-  4.whether all or only a limited number of Member States should join 
-  5. legislating for the EUCIT.   
-  6. administering the EUCIT 
-  7. the political acceptability of the EUCIT 
  
IV.1.The Perimeter of the EUCIT . Applicable to which corporations ? 
A/ Introduction  
The EUCIT, but also the alternative comprehensive schemes, raises the question of which
companies should  be liable to it. This issue of ‘eligibility’ boils down to two subquestions.
First, should the  perimeter of the EUCIT be restricted to one or to a few categories of
multinational companies that are operating through affiliates in other Member States?
Secondly, should subjection to the EUCIT be mandatory or result from a free option by the8
eligible companies? These issues are treated here in a rather summary fashion, as they are
analysed elsewhere in a more detailed way by this author.
9 
There are a number of arguments why a universal application of the EUCIT ( and of the
CCBT ) to all enterprises that possess the juridical qualification of a limited liability company
cannot realistically be contemplated. First, almost by definition, it would  de facto not apply
to companies that operate only in their home country; and despite the further cross-border
integration process, many , family-type companies will retain a purely national , or even
regional horizon. . Secondly, the very rationale of the EUCIT is to cater primarily to the
specific profile and tax problems of companies that operate in a large number of Member
States; the same can be said about the CCBT and even of the HST. Thirdly, the budgetary
needs of the EU superstructure are likely to remain limited, as the EU supranational acts
essentially by enacting Regulations or Directives, that aim at achieving, and preserving, a
genuine Internal Market; the outlays that are made directly through the EU budget will almost
certainly remain comparatively low, as the sectors that are gobbling up the budgetary
resources – education, health , public administration—will, and should, remain the preserve of
the National States; hence, any federal superstructure in the EU will be a ‘light’edifice sui
generis,  which intermediates much less budgetary means than central governments in federal
states, such as Germany or Belgium. The subsidiarity standard will retain its prominence. And
finally,  
tax administrations would be overwhelmed if they would have to tackle all companies under a
novel tax law. As the Report states: “ Thus, ideally any  comprehensive approach should be
extended to all companies. There are, however, practical arguments in favour of a gradual
approach, starting with some companies and thereafter extending to include others” ( p. 403).    
With respect to the EUCIT , but also the CCBT , there are three categories of companies
which, at first glance, emerge as suitable candidates for the ‘partial’ implementation of the
EUCIT, but also for the CCBT. They are (i) large enterprises, which have attained  a high
degree of multinationality within the EU (ii) companies listed on stock exchanges  within the
EU and (iii) companies which qualify as a ‘Societas Europaea’( see above section II f/ ),
Admittedly, restricting  the perimeter of the EUCIT , or of the CCBT , to  such categories,
involves a discrimination amongst enterprises that all carry the legal label of a ‘company’;
this issue is taken up,  after the three ‘candidate-categories’ have been  discussed.     
B/ Large multinational  companies
The  original version of the EUCIT envisaged to restrict its perimeter, at least in a first stage,
to a limited number of large MNE’s that operate in the EU. These are the enterprise groups,
for which the problems that are inherent in the present, ‘ separate entity’ arrangements are
most acute, indeed.  
In this vision, one should apply the EUCIT only to ( large) MNE’s  that e.g. (i) attain a
sizeable turnover within the EU and (ii)) are operating out of, say, at least 6 Member States.
Where the borderline should exactly be drawn, would depend on the anticipated amount of
revenues from the EUCIT and on administrative considerations.  
10
Obviously, the EUCIT would also apply to MNE’s  headquartered outside the EU, say in the
United States, provided they fulfil the same conditions for eligibility as do EU-headquartered
MNE’s.  To this effect, such firms should designate one of their affiliates in the EU as the unit
in charge of complying with the EUCIT. 9
C/ Companies listed on a stock exchange within the EU 
These firms could constitute an alternative  set of companies, suitable for application of the
EUCIT , or the CCBT.  According to data from the European Federation of Stock Exchanges,
on regulated stock exchanges, such companies presently add up to about 7.500.  Several
arguments can be advanced in favour of restricting the EUCIT to listed companies. They are
often quite large: their list would overlap to a considerable extent with the set of companies,
that were considered in the previous paragraph. Listed firms must comply with high
accounting standards which, as from 2005,will become unified, in line with the IAS standards.
In the meantime the many differentiated procedures as regards the admission to the listing, the
supervision of securities market and several other aspects will hopefully become harmonized,
if not unified, by the year 2005, provided the action program, proposed in the Lamfalussy
Report
11 of early 2001, is  implemented. And the move towards consolidation of the still
excessive number of stock exchanges in the EU, already underway
12 is likely to gain further
momentum and to result eventually in the creation of a pan-European stock exchange. All
these developments will enhance the comparability of the performances of the listed
companies before tax; a common tax regime would extend such comparisons to the  after tax
results. 
D/  Enterprises established as ‘ European Companies ‘  
After a hibernation, which has lasted 30 years, the ‘Societas Europaea” (S.E ) has finally
come to life.  It harmonizes several aspects of the company legislations of the Member States,
although it falls short of creating a unique, EU body of company law: on several segments of
company life, each S.E will still be governed by the laws of the state where it is
headquartered, so that there will still be 15 somewhat different national company legislations.
The benefits of the S.E status, in terms of a less cumbersome management and of lower
administrative costs are nonetheless noteworthy.  Thus, S.E ‘s are enabled to operate as a
single corporate body: it follows that they could even function in other Member States,
without the need to establish subsidiaries, but could content themselves with operating
through branches. The S.E will also be able to submit their financial accounts to investors in
consolidated format. 
But the Regulation on the S.E’s does not contain any stipulation as regards their tax treatment.
Accordingly, the prevailing rules, i.e. those embedded in the ‘separate entity’ paradigm,
remain applicable to the parent company and its foreign affiliates; each of the members of the
multi-national group remains confronted with the corresponding tax laws of the country,
where it operates.  
The absence of an appropriate tax complement to the S.E statute explains the lukewarm
reactions of the business world to the new legal instrument of the S.E. It also explains why the
Commission’s Report on Company Taxation states that “ the rules governing who may
establish a European Company are relatively well developed and restricting a comprehensive
approach to this category of company would be straightforward and  justifiable “( p. 407). The
Communication, remarking that “the concept of the European  Company is closely linked to
that of a common company taxation system” suggests that “ an appropriate ‘pilot project ‘
might usefully be introduced for such companies” (  both references on p. 18).   
The ‘Societas Europaea” does emerge as the prime candidate for a ‘partial’application of a
comprehensive tax scheme. One significant virtue would be that both for  ‘fiscal’ and the
‘commercial’ purposes, crossborder consolidation would be allowed. 10
One problem, as I see it, is that the number of firms applying for S.E ‘commercial ‘ status is
likely to be very large, once a fiscal complement, say in the shape of CCBT or of EUCIT, is
available. Both the tax and the commercial aspects of running a S.E would become much
simpler and less costly. The response to the S.E would then become highly positive, and even
enthusiastic. A large number of companies would then be candidates for S.E status, the more
that the eligibility criteria contained in the Regulations on the S.E ‘s are quite ‘ open ended’.
Thus, mergers and acquisitions between firms in different Member States, the setting up of a
common Holding Company, or of a common subsidiary, are avenues for access to S.E status.
These subsets of S.E’s are likely to be rather large companies. But besides, any company,
incorporated according to its  national legislation, can transform itself into an S.E, provided
that it operates a subsidiary in another Member State since at least two years. This clause
allows small and medium sized enterprises to venture abroad under the S.E flag. (It is also
noteworthy that   eligible companies are not obliged to adopt the S.E format, but must freely
opt for it). 
The wide access to S.E status has the obvious advantage that it does not discriminate between
large and smaller enterprises. But one may fear that a large flow of candidates for S.E status,
would overwhelm the capacities of the tax administrations-- even if the latter, thanks to the
consolidated approach, would soon benefit from a substantial reduction of their work load. A
phased introduction of a comprehensive corporate tax to SE’s might then be considered , as
pointed put in the Communication. One could conceivably start with large MNE’s ? This
point requires more analysis. 
E/ Optional or Mandatory Systems ? 
Leaving the free choice to the MNE’s  is perhaps  politically more palatable, at least in the
early stages of a comprehensive model. The Report, while also stressing several  drawbacks,
seems nonetheless to support the optional road.  Business representatives on the Experts’
Panel Two also advocate the optional entry to the  CCBT and the HST ‘(see the Report ,p.
403). Yet, the Communication does not mention or even discuss the issue of the optional or
compulsory application of the CCBT or the HST; the issue apparently remains open. 
In the 1997 article on the EUCIT, I have argued in favour of its mandatory application to all
MNE’s that would, equally in an obligatory way, be encompassed in the perimeter of the
EUCIT. Elsewhere,
13 and equally with respect to the other comprehensive schemes, I have
come to reject the optional ‘facility’, not only for the EUCIT but also for the other
comprehensive schemes. However, such position is held under the assumption, that a
comprehensive scheme would only be applied in a partial way, i.e. restricted to a specified set
of companies, such as larger MNE’s , listed companies, or those with S.E status. 
As a matter of fact, the possibility for firms to opt for the EUCIT or the CCBT would entail a
differentiated treatment of firms that are economically quite similar, say large MNE’s.
Besides, considering that a comprehensive scheme would permit inter-national loss
compensation and significantly lower the compliance costs of companies, most likely only a
small proportion of the eligible firms would prefer to remain under the old, intricate system. It
follows that whether to opt or not to opt may prove to be largely a non-issue. Why then retain
the optional route to the EUCIT or the CCBT, if it would be availed of by only a small
percentage of the companies?  11
Hence, a compulsory format appears preferable to an optional one. This principle would also
be in order if the CCTB or the EUCIT would be applied to companies that have obtained the
S.E status. As the legal concept of S.E cannot be circumscribed to a given set of companies,
that would correspond to objective yardsticks, such as their size or their being listed on stock
exchanges, the access to the commercial side of the S.E statute must, of necessity, result from
the free choice of the firms themselves. But, once they have secured the S.E status, leaving
the freedom to choose in favour of the fiscal side would unnecessarily complicate tax
administration. Furthermore, as the S.E rules already imply the consolidation of the accounts,
for purposes of commercial reporting, one fails to see why the firms, that would have been
granted S.E status, would turn down the opportunity to secure  fiscal consolidation, which is
an  essential component of the holistic schemes. 
F/The issue of discriminatory treatment 
The preceding analysis warrants the conclusion that a partial application of the comprehensive
tax format, appears unavoidable, were it only in the light of administrative considerations.
This then involves a fiscal discrimination between the companies that are included in the
scheme, and those that are left out. This would be equally the case, if the companies were
permitted to exercise, or to reject, the option to join. 
The discrimination inherent in partial approaches raises a genuine problem, as a different
fiscal treatment should be avoided, to the extent possible.  But such divergences are
warranted, when the enterprises that are incorporated as legally autonomous companies and
which wear the same legal cloth, present widely diverging economic features.  Thus, there is
little similarity between large multinational enterprises with their large number of affiliates,
and, at the other end of a highly varied spectrum, a family enterprise, which in order to benefit
from the limited liability of shareholders, is formally established as a corporate body. In the
latter, the owner-shareholder most often also acts as the manager, in a large company the two
functions are delinked. Besides, fiscal considerations are often a major motive for the
incorporation of a  family firm: as long as the profits remain undistributed, the owner-
shareholder can avoid the impact of higher marginal rates in the personal income tax. 
14 Thus,
differences in the fiscal treatment of economically different companies may be justified--
apart from considerations of administrability. Neither should one overlook that national
corporate profits taxes often differentiate between large and ‘ small and medium-sized
companies ‘. 
In conclusion, there are solid arguments for hooking a comprehensive company tax on one of
the three segments of companies, that were outlined above, despite  the inevitable
discrimination vis-à-vis companies that fall outside the purview of the tax. There is less
justification for applying, say the EUCIT, only on companies which would have opted for it,
as this would unduly discriminate with other firms with comparable economic features . 
Other things being equal, the companies to which the comprehensive model would apply
would normally enjoy a lower effective tax burden, as they would be able to offset losses;
besides, their tax compliance costs would also significantly be lowered. To re-establish the
balance with the group of companies that would remain outside a comprehensive scheme, the
Report (p.403,416) moots the idea – which is apparently supported by business
representatives —that  ‘special rates’ might be applied. This would imply that the ‘ in’s ‘ be
subjected   to a somewhat higher rate than the ‘out’s’. 
IV.2/ The Taxable Base of the EUCIT 12
Both for the EUCIT and the CCBT, a new tax code would have to be crafted and  agreed
upon. What would be the contents of such novel corporate tax, that would exist alongside the
other national tax systems? Let us first look at the design of the taxable base – an undertaking
that would be common to the EUCIT and the CCBT. Then, I comment on a hallmark of all
comprehensive patterns of EU corporate taxation, namely  the consolidation of the taxable
bases of all units of the same multinational group within the EU-area.   
A/ Defining the taxable base of a novel corporate tax  
It may be objected that it would be laborious to secure a consensus amongst the Member
States , with respect to the taxable base of the EUCIT ,or the CCBT.  The base is made up of a
large number of essential structural elements, hat are actually modulated in differing ways in
the various national tax legislations, indeed.  One is led to remember that the efforts to
achieve harmonization in the EU of only some of those areas, have so far proven
unsuccessful. 
But this conclusion is overly pessimistic as : 
-  The  Commission’s Report, in its Part II, A/ contains a detailed ‘qualitative
analysis’ of company tax systems in the EU. Apart  from (i) the tax rates, nine
other ‘structural elements’ of a typical corporate tax system are being surveyed,
namely (ii) tax accounting rules (iii) depreciation (iv) provisions (v) losses (vi)
capital gains (vii) mergers and acquisitions (viii) group relief/consolidation
(including inter-group dividends ) (ix) inventories and ( x) expense deductions. It
was found that  “…there are substantial qualitative differences in certain areas“ but
that  “ in a number of cases the changes that would be required to bring Member
States closer together would not appear to be major and in a number of categories
one could question the ‘need’ for the detailed differences” ( p. 67). Hence, on
several of those structural parameters, agreement would be rather easy. 
-There is a high degree of agreement about the overall philosophy that should  shape
the taxable base of corporate income taxes.  As a matter of fact, from the 1980’s 
onwards, an international consensus has emerged, to weed out a large  number of 
allowances, deductions and the like, that narrow the taxable basis,   but , as a quid pro 
quo, to markedly reduce the nominal tax rates. National tax laws have quite often been
adjusted accordingly. It has become acknowledged, indeed, that   ‘tax expenditures 
‘(i) have doubtful incentive effects,  as most often they do not trigger the decision to 
invest and merely amount to a windfall profit for firms that would have invested 
anyhow; (ii) they often discriminate between sectors and  distort competition; and 
(iii) they render the tax system and its administration more complex.  
            -The EU now acts against harmful tax competition 
 -Some policy goals, as the need to foster R and D, that are pursued by way of tax 
incentives, are basically shared by all Member States and could be entrusted to  the 
E.U level, i.e. made part of the EUCIT , instead of  being operated in each 
national tax law.  This is even more the case for tax incentives that would pursue 
explicit EU objectives,  such as  investments in less developed regions.  
--As already mentioned, progress is also in sight as regards accounting rules. ned . 
By 2005, listed firms will have to adopt the IAS standards, as regards their 
disclosure to shareholders. The EUCIT or the CCTB legislator would have to 
decide to what extent the accounting standards for commercial reporting  should also 
be applied in the tax  field. Practices of Member States differ in this respect;
15 this is13
discussed in the Report, p.318-24. It should not be too difficult to devise, for tax 
purposes, a (single) scheme benchmarked to ‘best practices. 
     
B/ Consolidation of the taxable bases 
This essential feature of the new comprehensive schemes views the various units 
of MNE’ s within the EU as interconnected members of the same family. This 
‘group’ concept is actually enshrined in the legislations of most Member States( 
although not in Italy, Belgium and Greece), but only in a domestic setting; the German
‘Organschaft’ provides a well-known example. The negation of the group concept 
implies concretely that the losses of a subsidiary within Belgium cannot be offset 
against the profits of its Belgian parent company. Losses in branches ( ‘permanent 
establishments’ in the tax jargon ), which are not vested with legal personality, on 
the other hand, can usually be compensated against the profits of their parent 
company.  
Thanks to EU-wide consolidation, it would become possible to offset the losses in 
a subsidiary in another Member State against the profits of the parent company.  For 
tax purposes, the results within the EU, of the whole group, would be treated as an 
interrelated, single taxable object. This carries the connotation that the EU scene 
should no longer be viewed as an area of juxtaposed national markets, but as a large 
single market.  
The consolidation does not only affect the status of subsidiaries that incur losses. 
It also, by definition, implies that internal transactions between members of the  same 
enterprises are eliminated so that only those conducted with external  counterparts 
– the only one’s that generate a flow of real profits for the  enterprise – are  reflected in
the accounts. Consolidation accordingly would solve the thorny problem of transfer 
pricing within the EU—provided the various Member States program the same tax 
burden (as is the case in the  EUCIT ). Or, if tax rates  remain differentiated amongst 
Member States ( as under the CCBT )  the extent to which companies would be 
tempted to indulge in transfer pricing gambits would depend on the dispersion of the 
rates between the Member States and  the  scope for transferring values of the 
proxied factors( such as ‘ sales turnover ‘ )  to leniently taxed jurisdictions.  
One objection might be that consolidated accounts for the EUCIT and CCTB 
schemes and even for the HST, only cover the EU Member states, whereas the  larger
MNE’s  typically consolidate on a worldwide basis, when they report to investors. 
16. 
The restriction to the EU-area would involve some extra work, indeed. But 
consolidated accounts are built up from the various ‘national’ accounting data in the 
countries where the affiliates are  located.  Most importantly, submitting  a 
single consolidated return to the fisc for the EU-operations, already represents  a vast
simplification, as compared to the present country-by-country segmentation of the 
accounts . Moreover, the Euro already eliminates the need to ‘translate‘ data from the 
currency of a given Member State into that of the  parent company.  
IV.3/ The applicable Rate(s) and the Allotment of the Proceeds to the European Union and /or
over the various Member  States 14
These are two parameters, where the EUCIT and the CCBT evidently part ways. Hence , it is
advisable to first discuss the EUCIT, then to turn to the CCBT—both in their original
formulation – and finally to ascertain whether the analysis suggests variants.  
A/ The European Corporate Income Tax ( EUCIT ) 
In the original blueprint, the EUCIT would, in principle, be accruing to the EU budget, and
not to the Member States. It would be one of the revenue sources of the EU.  The very fact
that the EUCIT carries a single rate, obviates the need to split the EU-consolidated base over
the Member States—as is the case in the CCBT. . 
The proceeds would represent not only a component of the ‘own resources ‘ of the EU,
transferred upwards d from the Member States, but would be a genuine ‘own tax’‘ ( as the EU
would have the competence to design it ). This makes sense, as  the high degree of integration
of the economic activities of the taxpaying MNE’s, and the difficulties inherent in segmenting
the consolidated net profits over the various jurisdictions in which they originated, argue for
the assignment of the EUCIT to the level of the EU itself, within a system of fiscal federalism.  
It can be objected that, if, in a primary allotment, the proceeds were fully accruing to the EU
itself, they may easily exceed the budgetary needs of the EU; for the EU as a whole, the
corporate income taxes amounted to 3,2 % in 2000. ( see the data in the Report, p. 22 ).
Hence, a mechanism should perhaps be devised to achieve a secondary redistribution  of this
‘surplus’  over the Member States. How could this be done? 
Such excess proceeds should obviously not be ‘returned’ to the Member States in proportion
to the taxable profits that have their ‘source’ in each of them.  Such an approach, the single
rate of the EUCIT notwithstanding, would reopen the ‘Pandora’s box’ of the ‘separate entity’
approach, with all its attendant difficulties, which the very EUCIT scheme ( but also the
CCBT) intends to overcome.  Hence, if one were to achieve the demarcation of these
‘geographical, national sources’, one should apply simpler,  ‘formulary’   criteria. 
Could the ‘formulary allotment’, replicated from the American, or preferably the (simpler,
because more uniform ) Canadian model of ‘unitary taxation’ – discussed in more detail in the
next section --  provide a solution for such secondary redistribution? In my view, this would
be counterproductive. Such allotment system would entail a needless complication, as it uses
a set of proxies that are divorced from the traditional ‘accounting’ approach to the
determination of taxable profits, which enterprises are accustomed to practise; it would also
mean that such proxies must be calculated for each  the taxpaying MNE’s,  with attendant
compliance costs for the taxpayers and the need for the tax administration of the Member
State where the MNE operates its headquarters, to ascertain whether the values of the proxies,
that have been declared for the foreign affiliates, conform to reality.  
The proper approach for achieving a secondary re-funneling of excess revenues from the
EUCIT, would consist in the adoption of an allocation at the ‘macro level’, and no longer at
the ‘micro level’ of the taxpaying enterprises concerned. This would circumvent the
complication just mentioned ; it would also allow to implement theories and practices of
federal state, that go beyond the mere implementation of the ‘juste retour’ yardstick. This
issue requires some further elucidation.  15
The constitutional arrangements in federal states typically guarantee that the subnational
entities get a substantial portion of their ’own’ fiscal resources’ out of the a specified
percentage of proceeds from taxes that are levied at the federal level. Following such
‘vertical’ sharing of the tax pie, ‘horizontal’ allotment keys must be agreed upon, to determine
how the portion reserved for the subfederal level, is to be divided further amongst the various
entities at that level. This can be performed, according to alternative criteria; the two major,
and opposite yardsticks are: 
(i) the ‘derivation’ or ‘ juste retour ‘  principle, whereby each subnational unit is
entitled to the proceeds that originate within its territory. This criterion favours the richer
entities.  
(ii) the ‘differential needs’ principle, whereby, in the light of measurable objective
indicators, as e.g. the per capita income levels, some degree of redistribution is achieved to
the benefit of the comparatively poorer members. 
Some degree of solidarity and hence, of fiscal redistribution (‘equalisation’,
‘Finanzausgleich)  in is a congenital dimension of a federal system, as otherwise the very
existence and essence of a federal system would be negated. But this cannot be carried too far,
lest the more affluent members of the federation would go it alone. So, the two antithetical
distributional keys are often combined and reconciled. 
After this digression, let us return to the EUCIT . The disposal of possible EUCIT excess
proceeds would have to be designed within the broader framework of the EU budget and
strategies, and the calibration of the contributions of each Member State to the EU budget. 
As regards the ‘juste retour‘ criterion one should look for reliable ‘keys’. Those geared to an
allocation on the micro level – most prominently amongst them, the ‘unitary tax ‘ systems in
the United States and in Canada – are suited to comprehensive systems, and more particularly
to the CCBT,  in which the need arises to determine the share of the overall consolidated net
profits to which each of the Member State involved is entitled , and on which it can impose its
own rate.  
Conversely, in the EUCIT, there is no need to apply a ‘ micro-level’ allotment, but it could
and should resort to  ’macro level’ apportionment key(s).  As the Report  notices ( p. 415),
“allocation at such a macro level might really only be appropriate if it were  the tax itself,
which was being  allocated , in which case such a macro level allocation implies a common
rate of tax “ 
Subject to further refinement, the GDP’ s of the different Member Countries, are likely to
provide a suitable and politically acceptable ‘horizontal distribution’ key’.  As  a matter of
fact , in the realm of  corporate-- as well as individual – income taxation , the ‘source‘
countries, where the taxable profits originate, have a prior taxing claim over the residence
countries. There probably also exists a fairly close correlation between the GDP’s of the
Member States and their proceeds from the various corporate tax systems, especially as in the
EUCIT system tax rates ( and bases ) would no longer diverge. Alternatively, GNP values
could also be applied; this would be slightly more advantageous for Member States which
headquarter a number of large MNE’s , such as the larger Member States and, say , the
Netherlands and Sweden, as compared to , say,  Belgium. 
But, as just stressed, systems of fiscal federalism , are not exclusively predicated on the ‘
derivation’ yardstick.  The keys for re-allocating revenues to the subfederal level can be16
modulated so as to achieve some degree of net redistribution of fiscal resources, to the benefit
of the poorer Member States. This is also already practised, to a limited degree,  in the present
EU budget , with respect to the ‘GNP contributions’ by the Member States. Hence, in the
EUCIT the secondary redistribution of the excess proceeds could be modulated so that the
poorer Member States would get a higher share than the portion that would conform to the
‘juste retour‘ principle. 
What if, instead of endowing the EU itself with the prime proceeds from the EUCIT , it were
decided that the proceeds from the EUCIT, its  single rate notwithstanding,  would would be
allocated fully to the Member States and divided amongst them?   This is a conceivable
variant of the EUCIT, which is mentioned in passing on p.377 of the Report. 
If the full re-distribution over the Member States were based on the same micro-level
allocational approach as in the CCBT , i.e on the ‘unitary tax ‘ methodology , the resulting
system would be tantamount to the CCBT itself. But it is also conceivable that a macro-key,
say GDP, be applied to the apportionment of the proceeds of the tax, levied with a single, EU-
legislated rate. The resulting format would be a hybrid between the EUCIT and the CCBT .
The macro-approach to the re-distribution of the ( primary ) proceeds from the tax , with its
retrocession  in globo, would  be simpler to handle than if the micro-based unitary tax
approach were applied. But the single rate feature would contradict the very rationale, why
the CCBT is advocated in the Communication by the Commission, which postulates the right
of the Member States to fix their own rate on the share of the consolidated taxable base,
allocated to each of them. And such a tax would no longer qualify as an ‘own tax’ proper at
EU level; the name ‘ European Consolidated Income Tax’ would become a misnomer, as it no
longer be encapsulated into a system of fiscal federalism.  
B/ The Common Consolidated Base Taxation 
As already mentioned in section III, the CCBT, as actually presented in the Report, differs
from the EUCIT in two essential dimensions. First, each Member States retains the right to fix
its own rate on that part of the EU-consolidated taxable base, which  is allocated to it.
Besides, the share of the taxable base, would be determined by the values of proxies, to be
calculated for each  MNE, i.e at a micro-level.
The Report considers the ‘unitary tax’ systems that are operated at the subfederal level in the
United States and in Canada as possible models for the CCBT. Contrary to the American
approach, in Canada the parameters, applied by the Provinces, are much more harmonized—
apart from the rates. “All of the provinces use the same two-factor property and sales formula
and generally use the federal income tax base, with only minor differences in the weights “ 
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The recourse to such system is likely to score an improvement over the present
arrangements, derived from 15 different corporate tax systems. But foremost experts on the
North American ‘unitary tax’ systems, who have also thoroughly investigated whether these
formats are recommendable to the EU, voice severe caveats. 
18 They stress that one should not
leave to  Member States the right to fix themselves the factors in the formula, and their
relative weights, as otherwise they would induced to give preference to  factors that favour
them . Neither has there been any evidence that market forces in the USA were moving the
formulas in the different States towards convergence. The authors also show that the use of
factors as proxies for the accountancy-derived real profits transform the corporate income tax
into a direct tax on the factors in the formula and that the effective rate on a factor is
commensurate with the use of that factor. 
19 With tax rates at variance amongst the Member17
States, transfer pricing gimmicks are not fully foresclosed with respect to the factor ‘sales ‘ or
‘gross receipts’, which can artificially transmigrate to lower-taxed jurisdictions-- especially
with the rise of digitally-intermediated transactions. The final verdict that “a formula
apportionment  system would not necessarily be less complex than is presently the case “ 
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pours a cold shower on any enthusiasm to transplant the ‘unitary tax‘ model to the European
scene—although the criticism is apparently addressed more to the ‘chaotic’ situation in the
USA than the more harmonized model in Canada. One may add that the ‘unitary tax‘
formulas are not embedded in the customary framework for assessing taxable profits, namely
on the basis of accounting data and standards; in this respect, the EUCIT scores better than the
CCBT. This would be particularly the case if only a subgroup of Member States would apply
the CCBT-with-‘unitary tax’ apportionment, and the others would stay outside it; the tax
authorities would then operate two quite different methods for assessing taxable profits. 
Differentiated tax rates, at national levels, entail distortions in the allocation of resources and
involve welfare losses. This is acknowledged in the Report. Although it basically accepts ‘ tax
(rate) competition’, it warns against too wide a divergence ( thus, on p. 423 and ** ). A 10 %
rate in Ireland and a 0 % rate in the prospective member Estonia is apparently proscribed. The
dispersion of the national rates in the CCBT should accordingly be constrained to a fairly
narrow band, which the EU would have to determine. This , obviously, narrows the reach  of
the fiscal sovereignty of  Member States.  
In such circumstances, variants to the original CCBT are worthy of attention. One consists in
a micro-level allocation on the basis of the ‘value added‘ in each of the MNE’s covered by the
CCBT. Subject to further enquiry, the Report, p. 414, seems rather favourably disposed
towards such approach. In the EU, contrary to the USA and Canada, enterprises are subjected
to the Value Added Tax. The data they have to maintain for the VAT could, with some
adjustments (excluding exports, including imports; depreciating capital investments instead of
immediately expensing them) be availed of to  construe  such micro-level yardstick. 
But why not then turn to the macro-level apportionment key that was suggested above for a
‘secondary’ redistribution in the framework of the EUCIT?   As a matter of fact, Gross
Domestic Product aggregates the values added in production in a country. Such a variant of
the CCBT would be considerably simpler to handle than the original specimen; it would not
impose reporting procedures on the companies; moreover, the final outcomes are unlikely to
diverge much than if the ‘values added’ in the enterprises  were to be established at the micro-
level.   
IV/ 4 / Full or Selective Participation  by Member  States 
This is another issue, raised by the comprehensive schemes. Do they require the participation
of all Member States, or only by a subgroup amongst them, which would be willing to embark
on the novel scheme? In terms of EU principles, the Nice Treaty legitimates the ‘enhanced
cooperation’ amongst ‘like-minded’ Member States that  would agree to move  faster along
the path of European integration. 
But such partial participation ratio would be far from optimal. The high degree of integration
of the activities of enterprises in the EU owes much to the fact that they view the EU as a
single market; and the basic rationale of holistic schemes is that they offer an appropriate tax
treatment to such integrated pattern of business. Besides, if, in a somewhat overcharged
example, only some smaller Member States would participate, the scope of the EUCIT or the18
CCBT would be significantly narrowed: such countries usually headquarter few MNE’s,
which would operate few affiliates in the other participating Member States. And again, if
apportionment formulas are adopted,  that deviate from the usual accounting methods for
measuring taxable profits, companies, and tax administrations,  would have to operate two
widely different systems for each of the two subgroups,  with attendant complications. 
The Report discusses this issue and states : “ Clearly, to qualify as ‘comprehensive’ a
grouping would have to involve a number of Member States but discussions in the panel if
exports  did confirm that notwithstanding the fact that participation of all Member States
would be preferable, a partial implementation would be a step in the right direction; In the
same way the creation of harmonized base by a limited number of Member States would be
seen as progress. “ ( p. 401). 
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IV/ 5/ Legislating for the EUCIT 
The drafting of a single, and novel corporate tax law, in itself, is not much of a problem,
provided a consensus is reached on its contents.  This would provide the opportunity to
prepare a ‘clean’ piece of legislation, which would substitute for the present national tax
statutes, that have been revamped repeatedly, by bits and pieces, and do not show structural
neatness or harmony. A substantial improvement, in terms of simplicity  could thereby be
achieved.  One may point to the centrally-planned countries that recently transited  to a
market economy: they had to introduce new tax laws. Thus, in 1994, in the  PR of China. 
Assuming that Member States would agree on the principle, and on the main contours of the
EUCIT, or the CCTB,  it  would be preferable to have such holistic scheme  adopted by the
European Parliament, were it only because of the democratic principle of ‘ no taxes without
representation‘. Anyhow, the Parliament would insist in having its voice heard.  
One may nonetheless question whether the Parliament is equipped for that task? There may be
a flood of amendments, some of them inspired by myopic national or sectional interests, that
would  harm the coherence of a the novel EUCIT or CCBT law. Hence, the technical
preparation of the EUCIT, or CCTB legislation, should not be entirely entrusted, in an ‘open
ended‘ fashion, to the Parliament. A strong leadership of the Commission and of the
governments would be required to avoid derailments along the intended route. But the
Parliament, obviously, must be associated with the preparatory work. 
IV/6/  Administering the EUCIT 
Whereas the CCBT would naturally be audited by the fisc of the country where the MNE is
headquartered, the EUCIT, a EU-tax proper, could conceivably be audited –especially if u
only a limited number of MNE’s would fall within its perimeter. This was the position
expressed in the original 1997 article on the EUCIT. But, alternatively, that task could, as at
present, be left with national tax administrations. This is, no doubt, in present circumstances, a
more realistic proposition, as national tax administrations would be reluctant to cede their
competence in this area. 
 
Admittedly, entrusting the administration to a single EU- corps of officials, would ensure an
even-handed application to all taxpayers covered by the scheme.  But auditing at the national
level has several advantages: it can be performed in the language of the taxpaying company.
Tax administrations would have to build a corps of auditors, skilled in dealing with companies19
with complex, border-crossing ramifications; but such specialization already exists today in
most countries. Tax auditors of the EUCIT would soon develop common standards of
administration. And if disputes between taxpayers and the fisc in the home country escalate
into judicial proceedings, the latter would be adjudicated by the national courts, according to
the new EUCIT legislation. The European Court of Justice would soon be called upon to
interpret the law, thus contributing to the body of tax rules in this area, that would attain a
high degree of evenness.   
Another problem may arise in holistic systems. To what extent do the tax authorities of the
Member States involved in a given auditing case, still have to cooperate with each other,
although, under the EUCIT , and the CCBT , the MNE only has to submit a tax return to the
fisc of the jurisdiction  is headquartered ? It is acknowledged that the application of the
residence principal in inter-national taxation runs into the difficulty of identifying and
measuring the taxable incomes in the host countries. 
22 This difficulty occurs particularly with
respect to individual income taxes. As regards corporate taxation, and subject to further
analysis, the very fact that the EU-consolidated accounts would be certified by professional
accountants provides a strong protection against the occultation of taxable profits in the host
countries. If the taxable base ( in the CCBT ) or the tax proceeds ( in the EUCIT ) would not
be apportioned according to accounting standards, but in reference to proxies, the problem
would be that of the truthfulness of the values attached to the factors in the formula’s.  But
even  a ‘unitary tax’ approach would probably be less susceptible to erosion by evasion
gimmicks,  than the present complex ‘ separate entity ‘ procedures.   
IV/ 7/ The  Political Acceptance  
An essential prerequisite before the EUCIT , and even the CCTB  and  HST formats can be
put into place, consists in their acceptance by the governments of the Member States. No
doubt, the present unanimity rule in fiscal matters is a major obstacle on the way to political
acceptance of far-reaching comprehensive schemes. This is probably particularly the case for
the the EUCIT, which vests the authority to fix the rates with the EU.  
Entrusting the competence to legislate in the field of company taxation  to the EU adds  a
federal, supranational element to the EU construction. The EUCIT moves furthest , and is
clearly cast within the framework of a fiscal federalist order. But also the CCTB involves the
abandonment of the fiscal sovereignty over an important segment of fiscal legislation, namely
that of defining the taxable base. ( And even in the HST , the host countries would no longer
design the taxable base of the affiliates of foreign enterprises but would acquiesce in applying
the tax code of the home country.)  
Tax sovereignty is highly valued by states and national governments; it is a symbol of their
overall sovereign status, and it hands them an instrument of fiscal policy, not only with a view
to modulating overall effective demand, but also to pursue specific sectoral or micro-
economic results. The argument for preserving national sovereignty in the fiscal field carries
more weight since the other main handle of macro guidance, that of monetary policy, has been
transferred since 1999 to the European Central Bank. 
But the capacity of a Member State to appropriate the revenues out of the taxable profits, that
should be attributed to it, within the present ‘separate entity’ system, is to some extent
illusory, because such revenues are eroded by transfer pricing and other tax planning gambits.
It also runs increasingly into technical difficulties. From the angle of tax administrations, the20
present arrangements involve high costs and some loss of revenues, on account of tax
avoidance and outright evasion and. As analysed in a recent article,
23 the basic reason why, in
an integrating economic space, fiscal sovereignty is increasingly being eroded, lies in the
mobility of taxable objects.  Globalization enhances the scope and the speed of such mobility. 
Besides, purely in terms of budgetary means, the transfer of revenues out of the corporate
income tax to the EU authorities, under the EUCIT scheme, would be neutralized by a
commensurate reduction of the revenues, such as those out of the VAT , that are currently
devolved upwards to the EU.   
It may be objected that, under the EUCIT, one tax handle, that of modifying the rate of the
corporate income tax, would no longer be available to the Member States but be vested with
the EU.  While this must be conceded, several considerations downgrade the relevance of
such objection. First, the timing of discretionary countercyclical fiscal measures is seldom
judicious, considering the time lag between the identification of an adverse economic
situation and the enactment of remedying tax measures, especially if the consent of parliament
is required. Fortunately, the ‘built-in-elasticity’ of tax revenues already acts in a
countercyclical direction. Moreover, as the economies of the Member States increasingly
coalescence, modifications of the tax rate, in the EUCIT,  for macro-economic purposes, may
as well be pursued at EU level, and could be enacted with less delays. And finally, national
governments would still have command over several other tax handles, such as the personal
income tax. 
A similar remark applies to the micro-economic or sectoral objectives, that would be pursued
by changes in the tax rates. First, the scepticism widely shared by scholars ( but much less by
the business sector and by political leaders… about  the efficacy of such tax incentives,
discussed earlier( see IV/ ** ),  should discourage an ample recourse to tax instruments.
Besides, where the pursuit of objectives through the tax medium remains recommendable, as,
for example, in favour of R and D activities, such concerns are likely to be relevant for the
whole EU. Hence, an  EU- wide approach may be superior to separate and uncoordinated
national initiatives, which, as a side effect, would cause distortions in the Internal Market. 
V/  The Rewards and the Pains of Comprehensive Models 
A/ The difficulties involved  
A comprehensive model of corporate profits taxation in the EU can only be designed if
previously a satisfactory solution is found for a host of  technical problems and if difficult
political choices are arrived at.  This paper discusses some of the major issues involved; and
yet, it does not pretend to be exhaustive or to explore the ‘fine print’ of detailed prescriptions,
which fill tax laws. Only a strong dose of ‘political will’ of the Member States would allow to
overcome such difficulties. Thanks to the unanimity rule, which is still prevailing in fiscal
matters, a single Member State can block attempts to move towards such a novel, and far-
reaching comprehensive scheme; the ‘enhanced cooperation’ between only a few member
states, while conceivable, is not recommendable. In the light of all these hurdles, some may
feel that the orientations sketched in the Commission’s Report and in the Communication, are
fated to soon fall into oblivion. 
This is nonetheless an excessively pessimistic projection.  The various factors, surveyed in
section II of this article, and particularly the desiderata of large businesses and the recent
institution of a EU corporate vehicle, provide a strong push towards the conceptual21
acceptance and the subsequent implementation of a comprehensive scheme, that would be
more attuned to the high level of integration of businesses in the EU.  
Most importantly, there is growing recognition that a comprehensive schemes would  mean a
significant improvement, both for taxpaying companies and fiscal administrations, over the
present convoluted ways of tackling the profits of MNE’s in the  EU.  A well-designed
holistic approach, although not perfect, would score much better than the present ‘separate
entity’ methodology, in terms of the criteria to evaluate a ‘ good’ corporate tax sysstem in the
EU , 
24 viz. 
-efficiency or allocational neutrality : taxes should interfere as little as possible with
the preferences of economic agents. Especially in a single market, the localisation of
investments and the operations  in a ‘level playing field’ should not be distorted by tax
parameters ; they should compete in a ‘level playing field’.  
-effectiveness: the ability of governments to implement their tax legislation and to
enforce the intended tax liabilities, so  that both double taxation and under-taxation are  absent
-low compliance costs : thanks to simplicity, certainty and transparency of tax
legislations  
-inter-nation equity : the Member States in the EU appropriate their rightful part of
corporate tax revenues . This (rather elusive) concept does not necessarily imply a ‘juste
retour ‘ flow of revenues; as argued above, the  Member States could bend the distributional
format of revenues towards some degree of solidarity with the poorer Member States.  
B/ The Rewards 
1/ The  EUCIT  would indeed entail substantial benefits for the companies covered by the
scheme, but also for tax administrations. As a matter of fact:  
- the eligible MNE’s  would no longer have to deal with up 15 national tax systems
and their intricate inter-national tax rules; they would  submit one tax return. This would
represent an immense simplification and reduction of compliance costs.  -  the  consolidation
of profits and losses of all entities of the same MNE , in the EUY area, eliminates a number of
problems that bedevil  the  inter-national arena, viz.  
- Losses would be consolidated with profits between all units of the MNE ; The
overall net result of the MNE within the EU would become the object of the corporate tax. 
 - Both subsidiaries and branches would be consolidated. Actually, they receive a
different fiscal treatment, because of their diverging legal specification,  although  their
economic substance is similar.  
-The distinction between residence and source principles would no longer be relevant
in the  corporate tax area 
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-Transfer pricing problems, today viewed as the most important problem in the
international tax arena, would be eliminated, within the EU.  This relates not only to the
firm’s transactions in goods and services, but also to the treatment of services that are
centralized at headquarters ( ex. R and D, or financial services). Manoeuvers to shift taxable
profits to a lower-taxed country would become self-defeating upon consolidation.
(Admittedly, the scope for transfer pricing disputes remains for transactions with affiliates
outside the EU.  But most trade in the EU occurs still occurs with other Member States; and
the tax authorities could  henceforth concentrate their efforts more on intra-MNE transactions
with outside countries. 
-Special preferential regimes, within the EU, say, tax haven affiliates, would become
useless. The profits, possibly siphoned off to such lower taxed depositories, would be
recouped upon consolidation. 
-Double taxation agreements between Member States would be applicable to
substantially less items ( namely to companies not covered by the EUCIT , and individuals)22
With outside countries, such as the USA, a single agreement with the whole EU would
replace the 15 pre-existing bilateral agreements .  
-Economically, the EU-area would, from  a  tax viewpoint, constitute a ‘level  playing
field’ for the firms, subjected to the EUCIT ; tax distortions would be  eliminated.    
- Almost certainly, assessments would be more effective than at present, as (i) some  major
avenues for ‘tax avoidance’ particularly transfer pricing modulations , would no longer  be
relevant;  (ii) the somewhat higher tax burden on operations through foreign  affiliates,  as
compared to purely domestic ones’ would no longer, would also disappear.
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2/ Most of those benefits would also be reaped under the aegis of the CCBT.  The EU-wide
consolidation of profits is a common feature of the EUCIT, indeed. In terms of allocational
efficiency, the CCBT scores less favourable. The tax burdens resulting from the new
corporate tax would vary between Member States. Whether such divergence would tempt
MNE’s to practise transfer pricing manoeuvres , would depend on whether the ‘formulary
apportionment system’, that would be put in place, is impervious to such avoidance gambits.
The ‘unitary tax ‘ system in the United States and even in Canada does not give such
guarantee-- apart from being alien to the way profits are customarily accounted for. The
conceivable substitution of  a ‘macro’ distributional key for one the ‘micro-level’ may
possibly  alleviate this concern. As against this, the CCBT recognizes the authority of the
Member States to fix themselves the rates on corporate profits. As explained in section I, the
Report privileges the sovereignty of Member States, and the resulting competition as regards
the rate setting, at the cost of allocational unneutralities.  
------------
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5 See Lodin, S.O and  Gammie , M.  “Home State Taxation “, Amsterdam: IBFD Publications
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17 Martens Weiner ,J., “The European Union and Formula Apportionment : Caveat Emptor “,in “‘European
Taxation”, December 2001. .
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